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 This paper reflects on two instances of contested openness occurring in the course of the 
recent saga involving Hlophe JP and the judges of the Constitutional Court (CC). While both gripping 
and significant, that broad and significant story itself is not the focus here.2  Instead, this work will 
examine two specific events within that larger narrative.  The first is the publication by the 
Constitutional Court of the fact that the judges of that Court were laying a complaint against Hlophe 
JP with the Judicial Services Commission (JSC).  The second is the pair of decisions by the JSC to hold 
closed hearings on the Hlophe matter and the reversal of both of those decisions in court.  In respect 
of the first event, the CC judges’ publication and media statement was itself the subject of two 
judicial decisions, one in the South Gauteng High Court and one in the Supreme Court of Appeal.3    
In respect of the second event, whether the JSC hearings would be open or closed was the subject of 
a public submission process initiated and conducted by the JSC as well as two judicial decisions, both 
going in favour of openness and against the JSC.   This paper will cover the expressed reasoning in 
these events as well as -- confining itself to the version of the facts that is publicly available – the 
underlying situation.4 
 This topic is a worthwhile and appropriate one for a colloquium like the current one.  The 
openness aspects of the Hlophe JP saga were clearly important but have not yet been examined at 
depth.  For instance, the decisions over whether or not to close the JSC were keenly anticipated in 
the media but were framed largely as a for or against decision regarding Hlophe JP.5  The issue 
became the person.  Thus it was the outcome that was reported on by the media and discussed by 
the commentators rather than the matter of principle.  Likewise, the decision to issue the media 
statement by the Constitutional Court judges as well as Hlophe JP’s decisions to counter-complain 
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(paper delivered at the University of the Witwatersrand, 5 October 2009) (citing other versions).  In his 
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place with the Judicial Service Commission Amendment Act 20 of 2008.  See D Milo ‘Presume Openness Not 
Secrecy’ Mail and Guardian (4 September 2009). 
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President in question.” 
before the JSC and to sue in the courts have largely been examined as particular fights within a 
larger battle rather than on their own.  This paper aims to begin to redress that inattention. 
 As an initial argument, I will argue that the final resting points of the law in both instances – 
that the JSC hearings be open and the determination that the media statement did not violate 
Hlophe JP’s rights – were correct and, further, that both resolutions may best be understood in 
terms of a concept of judicious transparency.  This concept differs significantly from two other types 
of transparency that were also often deployed and invoked in the Hlophe JP saga, types of 
transparency which one could term media transparency and public transparency. 
 
Part One:  The Media Statement and Its Judgment 
 The following six paragraphs taken from the SCA judgment give the relevant sequence of 
events prior to the issuing of the media statement as well as the context of its issuing: 
[10] During March 2008, the CC heard the Thint/Zuma appeals from [the SCA].  They were of 
public interest and importance since they concerned the prosecution of a high-ranking politician, Mr 
Jacob Zuma, on a number of counts. One of the issues related to legal privilege. The CC reserved 
judgment. It was ultimately delivered after the events that feature in this judgment* …+. 
[11] Towards the end of that month [Hlophe JP] visited Jafta AJ who concluded that the 
respondent had attempted to influence him to find in favour of Mr Zuma. Knowing that the 
respondent intended to visit Nkabinde J, he warned her of the possibility that the respondent might 
repeat his attempt. 
[12] The anticipated visit to Nkabinde J took place on 25 April, and she, too, concluded that the 
respondent had sought to influence her. At the beginning of May and soon after the court term 
began Nkabinde J made a report to another appellant and through her the matter was taken up with 
other members of the court. They met in the absence of two appellants, discussed the subject, and 
eventually agreed to lodge a complaint of judicial misconduct against the respondent with the JSC 
based on the information provided by the two Justices. This was done on 30 May.  
[13] The gravamen of the complaint was in these terms: 
‘A complaint that the Judge President of the Cape High Court, Judge John Hlophe, has approached 
some of the judges of the Constitutional Court in an improper attempt to influence this Court's 
pending judgment in one or more cases is hereby submitted by the judges of this Court to the 
Judicial Service Commission, as the constitutionally appointed body to deal with complaints of 
judicial misconduct.’ 
The document identified the case involved and stressed that there was no suggestion that any 
litigant was aware of or had instigated the respondent’s action. It contained further statements 
about the seriousness of the conduct; the democratic values contained in s 1 of the Constitution; the 
independence of the judiciary and the prohibition in s 165 of interference with courts; the judicial 
oath; that attempts to influence a court violates the Constitution and threatens the administration 
of justice; and that the CC and other courts would not yield to or tolerate attempts to undermine 
their independence.  
 [14] A media release in virtually identical terms soon followed, which was sent automatically and 
electronically to all subscribers to the CC’s information system.  
[15] It should be noted at this early stage that (a) the respondent was not apprised of the 
allegations or their source; (b) he was not asked for his version or comments; (c) he received no 
effective prior notice of the intention to lodge the complaint; and (d) he was not told of the 
intention to issue a media statement. The public, too, was not given any detail and was left with 
nothing more than the knowledge that a complaint with serious implications had been lodged. 
 Here endeth this excerpt of the SCA’s judgment.  While the SCA did not do so, it is important 
for the purpose of this paper to quote the media statement in full: 
STATEMENT BY JUDGES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
1 A complaint that the Judge President of the Cape High Court, Judge John Hlophe, has 
approached some of the judges of the Constitutional Court in an improper attempt to influence this 
Court's pending judgment in one or more cases has been referred by the judges of this Court to the 
Judicial Services Commission, as the constitutionally appointed body to deal with complaints of 
judicial misconduct. 
2 The complaint relates to the matters of Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others (OCT 89/07), JG Zuma and Another v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others (CCT 91/07), Thint Holdings (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Another v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (OCT 90/07) and JG Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(CCT 92/07). Argument in these matters was heard in March 2008. Judgment was reserved in all four 
matters. The Court has not yet handed down judgment. 
3 We stress that there is no suggestion that any of the litigants in the cases referred to in 
paragraph 1 were aware of or instigated this action. 
4 The judges of this Court view conduct of this nature in a very serious light 
5 South Africa is a democratic state, founded on certain values. These include constitutional 
supremacy and the rule of law. This is stated in section 1 of our Constitution. The judicial system is an 
indispensable component of our constitutional democracy. 
6 In terms of section 165 of the Constitution the courts are independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. No 
person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. Organs of state must assist 
and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness of the Courts. 
7 Each judge or acting judge is required by item 6 of schedule 2 of the Constitution, on the 
assumption of office, to swear an oath or solemnly affirm that she or he will uphold and protect the 
Constitution and will administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in 
Comment [W1]: Dear David:  Given 
that I am already quoting from the SCA in a 
lengthy opening quote, I’m not sure that 
this needs to g o in the text – this could be 
in an appendix at the back of the paper.  
What do you think? 
accordance with the Constitution and the law. Other judicial officers or acting judicial officers must 
swear or affirm in terms of national legislation. 
8 Any attempt to influence this or any other Court outside proper court proceedings therefore 
not only violates the specific provisions of the Constitution regarding the role and function of courts, 
but also threatens the administration of justice in our country and indeed the democratic nature of 
the state. Public confidence in the integrity of the courts is of crucial importance for our 
constitutional democracy and may not be jeopardised. 
9 This Court - and indeed all courts in our country -will not yield to or tolerate unconstitutional, 
illegal and inappropriate attempts to undermine their independence or impartiality. Judges and other 
judicial officers will continue - to the very best of their ability - to adjudicate all matters before them 
in accordance with the oath or solemn affirmation they took, guided only by the Constitution and the 
law. 
30 May 2008 
JUDGES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 The first court to hear Hlophe JP’s complaint regarding this sequence of events was the 
South Gauteng High Court.6  In a somewhat convoluted judgment, that Court decided in favour of 
Hlophe JP and against the judges of the CC.  The Court was however divided by three judges to two, 
with the two minority judges writing separate dissents.  The three majority judges were African; the 
two dissenters white.7  As the Supreme Court of Appeal noted, the High Court panel was “unusually 
though permissibly constituted as a full bench with five judges …”8    
Taking the appeal from the South Gauteng High Court, the SCA considered in paragraphs 48 
to 55 of its judgment the precise question of whether the media statement was unlawful by 
publishing the fact that the complaint had been made to the JSC.  In the view of the SCA, this 
question was separate and distinct from the issue of whether Hlophe JP should have been heard 
before the complaint was made.  Further, the SCA recognized that this precise question of 
publication had not been considered by the High Court, since it viewed the laying of the complaint 
and the issuing of the media statement as intertwined.9  Nonetheless, the SCA’s consideration of the 
lawfulness of the publication clearly linked the resolution of that question with the question of the 
lawfulness of the laying of the complaint.  The SCA stated  
“*o+nce having found the appellants did not act unlawfully in laying the complaint we can see no 
basis for finding that they were obliged to keep that secret for the reasons dealt with more fully 
below.  On the contrary there is much to be said for the contrary proposition (bearing in mind the 
                                                        
6  Hlophe v Constitutional Court of South Africa (08/22932) [2008] ZAGPHC 289, [2009] 2 All SA 72 (W). 
7  The majority consisted of Mojapelo DJP with Moshidi and Mathopo JJ concurring; separate dissenting 
judgments were written by Marais J and Gildenhuys J who would have dismissed the application. 
8  Langa v Hlophe (697/08) [2009] ZASCA 36; 2009 (4) SA 382 (SCA) (31 March 2009), para 1.  This was per 
authority of Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 s 13(1)(a). 
9
  Langa v Hlophe, para 48. 
circumstances in which it occurred) that the constitutional imperatives of transparency obliged them 
to make the fact known.”10   
The SCA then proceeded to quote [presumably] from the submissions of the Constitutional Court 
judges as follows:   
“‘In the circumstances where the independence of the Constitutional Court had been threatened 
and the integrity of the administration of justice in South Africa generally, it was considered 
imperative and appropriate that this be publicly disclosed. Should the facts have emerged at a later 
stage there would have been a serious risk that the litigants involved in the relevant cases and the 
general public would have entertained misgivings about the outcome and the manner in which the 
decisions were reached.  It was especially important that the litigants and the general public were 
informed of the attempt and that the Constitutional Court had not succumbed to it.” 
 The rationale expressed in this context by the judges of the Constitutional Court and thus 
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal is significantly circumscribed.  Stripped to its bare 
essentials, the reasoning is as follows:  “if word of the attempt to influence us got out, and it was not 
made clear that the attempt had failed, then the public would doubt our judicial decision making 
process but, never fear, the attempt to influence us did fail and our decision making processes are 
just fine and intact.”  This is an argument based on the Court’s core judicial function.11   Another 
relevant implication that one might draw from the statement is to the effect of “we think that there 
is a significant possibility that this word might get out. “  The CC thus did not appear to have total 
confidence in the informational integrity of its own decision-making processes. 
 In the view of the SCA, which has had the final word here, the media statement was not 
unlawful.  While the media statement may have been prima facie unlawful for carrying the 
implication that Hlophe JP had attempted to improperly influence other judges, a statement may be 
justified and that justification “can be raised validly if the statement was true and for the public 
benefit.”12  Indeed, according to the SCA, “*d+isclosure of an allegation of gross misconduct against a 
judge may in certain circumstances not be for the public benefit but that could hardly be the case if 
the allegation is true.”13  The possibility that the defamatory allegation in the statement was true 
thus needed to be considered in deciding whether the publication was unlawful.   That had not been 
done at the High Court level and the appeal thus succeeded.  In this way, without actually examining 
or determining the truth of the media statement, the SCA was able to determine the statement not 
to be unlawful. 
 
Part Two:  Opening and Closing the JSC Hearings 
 Given the mind-bending and attention-sapping twisty and tortuous path of the JSC 
consideration of the CC judges’ complaint (not to mention Hlophe JP), this paper may be forgiven for 
                                                        
10 Langa v Hlophe, para 50. 
11
  It perhaps thus ironic that it was the determination that the judges were not exercising a judicial function in 
making the complaint that decided the lawfulness of that question; see eg Langa v Hlophe para 47. 
12  Langa v Hlophe, para 51. 
13
  Langa and Others v Hlophe, para 54. 
merely summarizing the three decision-making instances regarding the question of opening the JSC’s 
disciplinary proceedings for Hlophe JP.   The first instance occurred in July 2008 when the JSC itself, 
in a commendable display of openness to public participation, decided to and did invite submissions 
on the question of whether the disciplinary hearings to be conducted in respect of Hlophe JP were to 
be closed or open to the public and the media (as for instance are the interviews of candidates for 
judicial office).14  This was done after Hlophe JP had made his counter-complaint.  A number of 
persons and organizations made submissions, including faculty of the Wits Law School.15  The second 
instance occurred after the JSC had decided on 28 March 2009 to close the hearings.  On the 
Saturday before the Wednesday scheduled start of the hearing, the JSC announced its decision – 
that the proceedings would be closed. 16  As Milo describes it, ‘*t+his decision prompted an urgent 
application, the day before the hearing was to start, by most of the major media groups – Avusa, 
Independent, Mail and Guardian, Media 24 and e-TV – and the Freedom of Expression Institute and 
the Centre for Applied Legal Studies.  The JSC argued that the hearing should be in secret in order to 
protect the dignity and statute of the office of the chief justice and the deputy chief justice of the 
Constitutional Court and of the judge president, all of whom would be required to give evidence at 
the enquiry.”  The JSC also noted that they would give reasons after the hearings.17  In the High 
Court, Judge Nigel Willis rejected the JSC’s argument “ruling that the dignity and statute of the 
judiciary as a whole would be enhanced rather than undermined if the hearings were to be held in 
the open:  ‘the dignity of the entire bench will be done a favour by these proceedings being in 
public.’”18 
The third instance consists of another court application, occasioned by the JSC’s decision on 
20 July 2009, despite the then-recent High Court decision, to hold a closed preliminary hearing into 
the complaint against Hlophe JP.19  In this instance, some of the applicants that went to court on 
behalf of openness went further than contesting the question of transparency.  Some asked for a 
ruling regarding the substance of the JSC process.  Rejecting such a substantive intervention, the 
court per Malan J, gave a decision that the openness as decided in the earlier case needed continued 
respect.20  
 As has been noted, these decisions on transparency were to some degree mere skirmishes in 
the larger campaign regarding Hlophe JP and, in the view of some, the transformation of the 
judiciary itself.  Nonetheless, these were important points of conflict, both for campaign within 
which they were waged as well as for constitutional and open democracy more generally.  After the 
decision not to proceed with the complaint was announced, a perceptive and witty Cape advocate 
                                                        
14  D Milo ‘The Very Soul of Justice’ Without Prejudice (June 2009) 12. 
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  See eg ‘Submission to the Judicial Service Commission by Members of the School of Law of the University of 
the Witwatersrand, July 2008’.  The Wits legal academics argued in part that “In a matter that has attracted 
enormous public interest, open hearings could have an important educational value in allowing the public to 
understand the issues at stake and the nature of judicial independence. By contrast, closed hearings will limit 
public knowledge and information, and limit the public’s ability to engage with the issues.” 
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  eTV (Pty) Ltd v Judicial Service Commission (13712/09,13647/09) [2009] ZAGPJHC 12 (31 March 2009). 
17  Judicial Service Commission, ‘ Media Statement, 31 March 2009, Justices of the Constitutional Court and 
Judge-President Hlophe, Reasons for Decision Not to Hold Hearing in Public’. 
18
  eTV (Pty) Ltd v Judicial Service Commission at 16. 
19   D Milo ‘JSC’s About-Face on Hlophe Tramples Public’s Rights’ Sunday Times (20 July 2009). 
20  Mail and Guardian Limited v Judicial Service Commission (Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Amicus 
Intervening) (09/30894) [2009] ZAGPJHC 29 (29 July 2009). 
pushed further the question of openness in a comment in the following terms:  “If, as has been 
suggested, the decision of the JSC has resulted in the undermining of public and professional 
confidence in the judicial system, then the fault surely must lie squarely at the feet of the members 
of the JSC, not with any one judge and his alleged indiscretions.  That being so, the attentions of the 
disenchanted should be focused squarely (and I would suggest exclusively) on the weaknesses that 
are to be found in the JSC’s make-up (its constitution, not its comestic façade) and its processes.  If, 
as has also been suggested sotto voce, the voting on the JSC on this issue was split along racial lines, 
then we need to establish alterative procedures that could cure the JSC of an apparent racial 
malady.  Is the procedure for the nomination of persons to serve on the JSC adequate?  Should the 
proceedings of the JSC be open to public scrutiny?  If voting were open and public, would members 
of the JSC be more accountable?”21 
 
Part Three:  Analysis 
The final legal determinations -- that the JSC hearings be open and the media statement was 
found not to violate Hlophe JP’s rights – were correct as matters of law.  It also and significantly 
seems correct that the July 2009 decision regarding the JSC did not go further than considering the 
question of openness.  In my view, the two final legal determinations may best be understood in 
terms of a concept of judicious transparency.  Judicious transparency is a form of openness 
ultimately linked to the Constitution’s notion of open justice, as articulated in the Independent 
Newspapers case.22   
In at least two dimensions, judicious transparency may be distinguished from other forms 
and rationales of transparency.  First, judicious transparency is distinct from what might be termed 
presumptive or media transparency.  To paraphrase, the media have almost never met an open 
hearing or proceeding that they have not liked.  Taken for granted is a presumption of openness that 
is the opposite of considered and nuanced.  This is practically a principle of professional qualification 
in the field. Indeed, media transparency may itself be a version of the second-best argument that 
Joseph Stiglitz has made on behalf of transparency.  His argument with respect to globalization and 
the place in that of international public legal institutions begins with a recognition that the first best 
thing at the moment is to change the governance structures of structures like the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO.  He then makes a clearly defined “a half loaf is better than no loaf” argument.  
“Short of a fundamental change in their governance, the most important way to ensure that 
international financial institutions are more responsive to the poor, to the environment, to the 
broader political and social concerns that I have emphasized is to increase transparency and 
openness.”23 
 In addition to its differences with media transparency, judicious transparency is also distinct 
from what can be termed public transparency, though it shares with public transparency many of 
the goals inherent in the support of constitutional democracy.  As an instance of public 
transparency, we can take the quote attributed to Prof Cathi Albertyn in the LegalBrief in October 
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  A Brown, Advocate (April 2008) 28. 
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  Stiglitz Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) +227. 
2009.24  This was on the occasion of the JSC’s decision, as is its constitutional duty, to nominate 
seven candidates for posts as judges of the Constitutional Court from the 22 shortlisted names it had 
previously decided upon.  Albertyn is paraphrased as saying the way the JSC currently operated was 
not transparent and quoted as its operation resulted in ‘us not ending up with the best 
constitutional lawyers because we are too busy looking at other things.’  Upon closer examination, 
Albertyn’s call resolves into two separate appeals.  One is that the criteria for judicial selection be 
better articulated.25  This call has been echoed elsewhere, for instance, in a well-crafted editorial by 
former Constitutional Court researcher Susannah Cowen.26  The second appeal relates to the type of 
questioning engaged in by the JSC commissioners.  Albertyn perceived, as indeed many members of 
the public at large do, that some candidates in the JSC got an easy run and some got a hard run.  In 
Albertyn’s view, there should have been greater consistency and, in particular, greater attention to 
constitutional conversations.  The interviews were like job interviews but should have been 
conducted at a higher level.  In this view, the primary value of the potential openness of the hearings 
would be their public educational potential. 
 Distinguishable from both of the above forms of transparency, the concept of judicious 
transparency is rooted in the constitutional concept of open justice.  This concept is itself derived 
from the rights of freedom of expression, the right of access to information, and the right of access 
to court.  It is further constituted by the direct implementation by judges of the constitutional 
principle of openness.27   A practice of judges related to demands for openness, judicious 
transparency is a particular form of transparency.  I would argue that it is not concerned, at least in 
the first instance, with the individual dignity of any particular judge.  Instead, it is its manner of 
implementation that makes it particularly judicious.  As for its substantive value, the substance of 
that value is indicated by the three rights from which the concept of open justice has been 
constructed. 
 I am not arguing that the lodging of the complaint was either politically wise or ethically 
necessary (or even correct).  Those questions of politics and of ethics are ones that are distinct from 
the admittedly narrow conception of judicious transparency that I am exploring here.  The question 
of whether the judges of the CC were wise to lodge the complaint has been explored in some depth 
by Theunis Roux from a law and politics perspective.28  Roux concludes that the decision to do so 
was ‘truly disastrous’ from the perspective of ‘the long-term project of subordinating political power 
to the rule of law’ and thus that the action of the judges was ‘regrettable’.29  Roux argues that, while 
the alleged conduct was serious enough to constitute gross misconduct, the judges should have 
                                                        
24  LegalBrief (6 October 2009). 
25  The JSC did attempt to meet a request for disclosure of the criteria.  See ‘Re:  Request for Access to Record 
of Public Body in terms of Section 18(1) of Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000’ V Masangwana 
to M Desai (3 April 2009)( listing in a paragraph the “wide variety of factors which are taken into account”). 
26  S Cowen ‘What Exactly Are We Looking For In the Ideal SA Judge?’ Business Day (17 September 2009). 
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  See Open Justice and Beyond (discussing the appropriate test for limiting open justice). 
28  Roux notes that he is assessing the action against ‘prudential criteria’.  T Roux ‘The South African 
Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 9.  In constitutional law and politics, prudential doctrines are 
ones crafted by courts to husband their institutional legitimacy and/or other resources.  They thus guide the 
decision of whether or not to exercise legal judicial power and assume that legal power may be exercised.  In 
other words, as Roux puts it, they are concerned really with the wisdom rather than the correctness of the 
decision.  T Roux ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 8 (not discussing in any 
depth the SCA decision). 
29
   T Roux ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 11. 
considered the likelihood that the allegations could be prosecuted to a successful conclusion and the 
negative implications for the lodging of the complaint ‘for public confidence in the Constitutional 
Court and the administration of justice in South Africa generally.’30  While there has been extensive 
discussion by commentators in the media, a comprehensive analysis of the ethics of the action of the 
judges of the CC remains to be undertaken.  The judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal did seem to 
indicate that as an ethical as opposed to a legal matter, the CC judges’ action might well be judged 
differently and negatively.31  The judicial ethics argument providing the foundation to the SCA’s 
suggestion has not yet been furnished, but might well be furnished by one of the perceptive and 
informed commentators on the place of the judiciary in the South African constitutional democracy, 
such as Richard Calland.  Interestingly, Roux does note that the most feasible alternative course of 
action open to the CC judges was to have called Hlophe JP to for his account to Langa CJ in his 
capacity as the Chief Justice and the head of the judiciary.32  To do so would have been to choose an 
ethical rather than a legal battleground.  Yet it was a legal battleground that was chosen – by both 
sides -- and that did indeed provide the weapons of conflict in both these incidents. 
Conclusions 
I see judicious transparency in the issuing of the media statement by Constitutional Court 
judges for three reasons.  First, the subject matter was on an important and delicate public matter, a 
fact situation at the intersection of partisan politics, the politics of judicial personnel, and the politics 
of the judiciary within a constitutional democracy.  This was a statement by judges about a judge 
and about judging.  Second, this was an instance of judicious transparency since this transparency 
had to be put into action by individual judges.  Their activity constituted a judicial practice.  There 
was no intermediary between the judges and the action that needs to be judged; it was not some 
official that took the action, the judges themselves did the deed.  Thus, it was the judges that were 
liable in terms of the applicable law of defamation, the private law arena in which the SCA judgment 
was ultimately fought out.33   Third, the judiciousness of the transparency practice needs to be 
examined within its proper context.  In particular, a context element that is important to take into 
account and is properly taken into account goes beyond the narrow judicial process reasoning given 
by the SCA.  In my view,  the credible evidence here that mentions the potential role of agencies of 
                                                        
30  Roux ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 8. 
31  ‘There is considerable merit in the submission that a judge who is minded to lay a complaint against a 
colleague has special duties that are not shared by lay complainants, for there is an overarching duty upon 
judges, in whatever they do, to preserve the dignity of the judicial institution.  Indeed, the Constitution itself 
commands all organs of state, which include the judiciary, to ‘assist and protect the independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility, and effectiveness of the judiciary’.  The duty that is cast upon judges no 
doubt calls upon them to act with due care and circumspection before exposing the judicial institution, and 
those who hold office in the institution, to loss of public confidence through allegations of misconduct, as 
submitted by the respondent’s counsel. That might indeed in some cases call for  an invitation to be extended 
to the judge concerned to offer an explanation for the alleged misconduct before a complaint is laid.  Whether 
that will be so in a particular case will necessarily be bound up with the particular circumstances in which the 
decision comes to be made, for there are peculiar complexities that are capable of arising if such an invitation 
were to be made.  But we are not called upon to consider whether that was called for in this case, in which we 
are not adjudicating ethical questions but questions of law.’ Langa v Hlophe para 42.  See T Roux ‘The South 
African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 8.  Roux also sketches the ethics framework then 
applicable to the action of Hlophe JP. 
32  T Roux ‘The South African Constitutional Court and the Hlophe Controversy’ 7. 
33  The publication of the lodging of the complaint was thus a private law analogue to the direct judicial 
conduct regulating access to court at issue in the Independent Newspapers case. 
national intelligence must be taken into account.  It effectively constitutes a broader attack on 
judicial independence and the administration of justice and arguably constitutional democracy.34  
This is judicious, appropriately not as a judicial function, but rather as a non-judicial decision taken 
by those entrusted to deciding judicially. 
I also see judicious transparency in the judicial re-opening of the hearings after decisions to 
close them were taken by the JSC.35  Here, it was two High Court judges that served to remind the 
JSC of the constitutional value of openness, and of the rights of freedom of expression, access to 
information, and access to courts.  These decisions did not and should not have turned on the right 
to dignity.  While relevant, dignity should not be the framing analysis.  Indeed, it may be appropriate 
to recall in conclusion that the SCA emphasized the equal worth of judges with other citizens.  Equal 
but not more equal. 
                                                        
34  Roux agrees that this threat constitutes an attempt to influence the decision of Judge Nkabinde but 
apparently would not go so far as to characterize the threat as broader.  For an official assessment of the 
precarious positioning of intelligence in the contemporary South African constitutional democracy, see 
Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, ‘Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy:  Final Report to the 
Minister for Intelligence Services, the Honourable Mr Ronnie Kasrils, MP’ (10 September 2008). 
35  Of course, the Sough Gauteng High Court decisions were jurisdictionally clearly legal reviews of the 
decisions of a public body, the Judicial Services Commission.  Thus, they do not precisely fit within my 
definition of judicious transparency.  Nonetheless, those court decisions do bear certain similarities in that 
they are about judges judging a judicial commission that itself judges judges.  Moreover, the substantive issue 
at stake in the judicial review was that of transparency, a key concept in open justice and open democracy. 
